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In “What Facts Should be Treated as ‘Fixed’ in Public Justification?” (2019), Andrew Reid 
examines the issue of when scientific claims ought to be regarded as beyond reasonable 
disagreement (i.e., as “fixed” facts). According to one common line of thinking, scientific 
claim S is beyond dispute whenever there is a scientific consensus on S. However, Reid aims 
to demonstrate that this criterion is underdeveloped and, as a result, permits some citizens to 
be deemed “unreasonable” even when they do not have sufficient reason to regard S as a 
fixed fact. 
 
Reid is explicit that his focus is restricted to Rawls, and his article illustrates how the matter 
of determining which scientific claims ought to be regarded as fixed represents an 
unresolved complication for Rawlsian public reason liberals. However, public reason 
liberalism, while greatly indebted to Rawls for his extensive development, has blossomed 
into a theory with a number of competing versions. Moreover, the problem that Reid 
addresses applies to public reason liberalism broadly construed. In light of this, I will situate 
the considerations highlighted by Reid within a broader context of public reason liberalism. I 
will begin with a brief overview of public reason liberalism and then provide a short 
description of some of the theoretical tools commonly employed by public reason liberals. 
Each of these tools will be referenced in the ensuing discussion. 
  
Public Reason Liberalism 
 
At the core of public reason liberalism sits a principle of public justification. While this 
principle is framed and articulated in various ways by different public reason liberals, what is 
common amongst the various formulations is the requirement that some principled set of 
coercive laws be justifiable to all citizens who will be accountable to such laws. Depending 
on the particular account, such a requirement may apply to only constitutional matters or it 
may be extended to cover all coercive laws, from constitutional matters down to matters of 
everyday legislation. Whatever the scope of a principle of public justification, the issue of 
whether a particular law is justifiable to a particular citizen is determined by inquiring 
whether the citizen in question has sufficient reason to accept the law.1 If all citizens who are 
answerable to law L have sufficient reason to accept it, then L is considered “publicly 
justified” and, hence, legitimate. 
 
In theory, then, all accounts of public reason liberalism incorporate a unanimity 
requirement.2 This is a direct consequence of asserting that a law that falls within the scope 
of a principle of public justification is not publicly justified unless each and every citizen 
accountable to the law has sufficient reason to agree to it. Of course, unanimity requirements 
have not traditionally been popular amongst political theorists since, among other reasons, it 
is difficult to imagine how citizens afflicted with moral and epistemic shortcomings could 
                                               
1 The question of whether a citizen has sufficient reason to accept a law is sometimes presented as inquiring 
whether the citizen could reasonably reject the law (Scanlon 1998). 
2 Here is Rawls’ principle of public justification with a built in unanimity requirement:  “our exercise of political 
power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all 
citizens as free equal may reasonable be expected to endorse in light of the principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason” (emphasis added, Rawls 1996, 137). 
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come to unanimously agree on anything (Schwartzberg 2014, 71-72). It is for this reason that 
public reason liberals are faced with the possibility that no laws whatsoever will get publicly 
justified. 
 
The Public Reason Liberal’s Toolkit 
 
Not to be deterred by the worry that public justification is unattainable, public reason liberals 
utilize a variety of theoretical devices in an effort to plausibly maintain that at least some 
laws will get publicly justified. Here are four such prominent devices: 
 
1. Moral and/or Epistemic Idealization. When public reason liberals ask whether a 
citizen has sufficient reason to accept some proposed law L, they are not 
asking whether the actual citizen – as he or she really is – has reason to accept 
L. Rather, they are asking whether that citizen’s idealized counterpart – one who 
is hypothetically cleansed of the actual citizen’s basic moral and/or epistemic 
defects – would have reason to accept L. Idealization is a way of preventing 
shortcomings in reasoning, and even moral beliefs, from undermining public 
justification. 
 
2. Public-Reasons-Only (PRO) Restriction. Public reason liberals who incorporate a 
PRO restriction place limits on the types of reasons that citizens can appeal to 
in order to support or defeat a proposed law. Advocates of the PRO restriction 
demand that citizens ultimately appeal to only “public reasons” and not to 
non-public reasons.3 Public reasons, sometimes referred to as “shared” 
reasons, are reasons acceptable to all no matter what personal comprehensive 
moral, philosophical, or religious doctrines one endorses. This has sparked a 
divide amongst public reason liberals, with consensus theorists endorsing the 
PRO restriction and convergence theorists rejecting it. 
 
3. Scope and Evaluation Restrictions. As already alluded to, public reason liberals 
must specify which laws ought to be publicly justified, if not all of them. Rawls 
believed that it is only constitutional essentials and other matters of basic 
justice that require public justification.  Other public reason liberals might hold 
that all laws should get justified, not just the constitutional essentials. However, 
there is also the related issue of what the appropriate item of evaluation should be. 
Are we to justify individual laws, packages of laws, constitutional articles, or 
whole constitutions? One dubious way to increase the likelihood that at least 
some laws will be agreed upon is to offer up arbitrarily-constructed packages of 
items in an effort to secure agreement (Gaus 2010, 198). 
4. Restrictions on the constituency of public reason. A common way amongst public 
reason liberals to implement this device is by dividing up the general public 
into two categories: the reasonable persons and the unreasonable persons. A 
                                               
3 Some consensus theorists follow Rawls and allow for non-public reasons to be introduced into public political 
discussion so long as, in due course, “we give properly public reason to support the principles and policies our 
comprehensive doctrine is said to support” (Rawls 1999, 144). 
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less abrasive version of this is to simply distinguish between reasonable views 
and unreasonable views. Those deemed unreasonable are excluded from the 
constituency of public reason – the group of persons whom a proposed law has to 
be justified to. As a result, when considering whether law L is publicly justified, 
public reason liberals do not always ask whether all citizens accountable to L 
have sufficient reason to accept it; rather, they sometimes only ask whether all 
citizens who comprise the constituency of public reason, with respect to L, 
have sufficient reason to accept L. By doing this, those pesky unreasonable 
people do not undercut attempts at public justification. There are of course 
worries about abuse here. We should avoid manufacturing public justification 
by groundlessly tossing all dissenters into the unreasonable category. 
The aim of public reason liberalism is not to fabricate agreement whatever the cost, but to 
identify the most appropriate normative structure to regulate the justification of coercive 
laws in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism among free and equal persons. As such, we 
should avoid deploying the tools of public reason liberalism for the purpose of merely 
securing agreement – doing so betrays the aim of public reason liberalism. Unsurprisingly 
then, debates within public reason liberalism often center on how these tools should be 
utilized. This is also true of Reid’s article in which the notion of a constituency of public 
reason (device #4) is central to the discussion. 
 
The Problem of Certification 
 
Reid maintains that Rawls was an advocate of the idea that some facts should be treated as 
beyond reasonable disagreement (i.e., as “fixed”4). While Rawls may not have used the 
phrase “fixed facts,” he did employ various similar-sounding phrases, such as “settled 
convictions,” “fixed points,” and “basic facts” to convey the idea that certain claims should 
not be open to dispute (1996, 8, 124). For Rawls, these are things which we accept 
provisionally, but with confidence. As a political constructivist, Rawls thought that certain 
moral claims ought to be regarded as settled convictions or basic facts, such as “slavery is 
unjust” and “exploitation is unjust” (1996, 124). On his view, for such statements to be 
regarded as reasonable, they need not be grounded in further moral argument. It is enough 
for Rawls that slavery, for example, would violate principles which he believes all people 
would agree to in the original position.5 To reject such a “settled conviction” is to be 
unreasonable. 
 
Rawls invokes these various phrasings when conveying the idea that certain types of moral 
convictions should be treated as basic. This raises the question of when Rawls would regard 
a scientific claim as achieving a status, similar to that of a settled moral conviction or basic 
moral fact, such that anyone who rejects the scientific claim would be considered 
unreasonable. It is well-known that Rawls asserts that “in discussing constitutional essentials 
                                               
4 To say that a fact is “fixed” is not to say that it is no longer open to dispute or somehow immune to 
challenge. A fixed fact is treated as true until reason surfaces that is sufficient to cause us to think otherwise. 
5 The original position is the hypothetical position in which deliberators are placed behind a “veil of ignorance” 
that deprives of them of knowledge of certain things about themselves, such as their position in society, their 
strengths and weaknesses, what they value, etc. (Rawls 1971, 12) 
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and matters of basic justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and 
philosophical doctrines…” (1996, 224-225). What are we to appeal to then? According to 
Rawls, “we are to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning 
found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not 
controversial” (1996, 224). As Reid explains, “[t]he latter is the body of knowledge that is the 
subject of an overwhelming and on-going consensus amongst scientists, and which has not 
been debunked using the scientific method” (2019, 493-494). 
 
Reid’s complaint is that, on the Rawlsian view, the existence of a consensus amongst experts 
is regarded as sufficient for treating a scientific claim as a fixed fact. But if this is an accurate 
depiction of the Rawlsian stance, it would, as Reid remarks, elicit the following corollary: “to 
invoke a fact that contradicts this scientific consensus whilst justifying a policy would be 
‘unreasonable’” (2019, 491). But since those holding views deemed unreasonable may be 
excluded to some extent from the constituency of public reason, there exists the potential 
for unjustifiable exclusion. 
 
It would be wrong to exclude someone from public deliberation on the 
basis that their political propositions are underpinned by a denial of 
facts that we can have no reasonable expectation for them to accept (emphasis 
added, Reid 2019, 493). 
 
On Reid’s view, the Rawlsian criterion is inadequate to the extent that it permits one’s 
rejection of a scientific claim to be treated as unreasonable even in cases where one does not 
have sufficient reason to accept the claim. Reid’s proposed solution is to shore up the 
criterion for fixed facts. In using terminology borrowed from Philip Kitcher, this is the 
problem of certification. Certification is “the phase of inquiry in which new findings are 
accepted or rejected as part of public knowledge” (Kitcher 2011, 12). Reid is specifically 
concerned with the certification of scientific claims. What are the circumstances in which a 
scientific claim ought to be certified such that it becomes part of the shared information 
base (public knowledge) and, as such, is unreasonable for anyone to reject? If the 
certification process is too broad (i.e., it allows claims to be treated as fixed facts when they 
should not), it runs the risk of abusing the fourth device in the public reason liberal’s toolkit. 
One way the fourth device is abused is when citizens’ views are improperly labelled as 
unreasonable and the “offending” citizens are consequently excluded from the constituency 
of public reason. It is this worry that prompts Reid to propose an additional condition on 
what qualifies as a fixed fact. 
 
According to Reid, simply having a consensus in the relevant expert community is necessary, 
but not sufficient for characterizing a scientific claim as a fixed fact.6 In cases where the 
general public is in disagreement, despite the presence of an expert consensus, Reid argues 
that scientific facts should be regarded as beyond reasonable dispute only when “a consensus 
exists amongst all reasonable citizens that there is reason to defer to experts in these cases” 
(2019, p. 491). To arrive at this consensus all reasonable citizens will need to partake in a 
second-order assessment of the debate. Reid understands this second-order assessment as 
consisting in (1) an evaluation of the credentials of the experts who are making factual 
                                               
6 I am setting aside the issue of how to determine when a scientific consensus has actually been achieved. 
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claims; and (2) an evaluation of the process by which a community of experts arrived at a 
consensus. 
 
Item (2) is important given that the judgments of scientific communities are not infallible. 
Like the rest of us, scientists are prone to cognitive biases and other errors of reasoning that 
sometimes lead to the endorsement of false claims. While working together as a community 
can often help to deflect some of these missteps, it provides no assurances against error. As 
such, just because a community of experts has reached a consensus, it does not follow that 
we should uncritically accept their claim(s). Rather, if a scientific consensus has been reached 
on scientific claim S, then while that gives us a strong reason to accept S, it is a reason that 
must be weighed against any other reasons we may have to reject S. In other words, at this 
early stage, our reason for accepting S is open to being defeated. 
 
Once a scientific consensus on a claim is reached, the establishment of that claim, amongst 
laypeople, comes via an exchange between experts and non-experts. Non-experts may make 
inquiries about “the process by which the specific experts in the field came to believe what 
they did” (Reid 2019, 496). Scientists have a responsibility to listen and respond to questions 
and objections formulated by those outside the specialist community. If they cannot do this 
or are unwilling to do this, then we have reason to reject their claims. We must then 
distinguish between a community of scientists reaching a scientific consensus and the general 
public being epistemically obligated to accept the claims comprising the consensus (or, at the 
very least, conceding that there is no good reasons to reject the claims). That scientists have 
simply reached a consensus is not sufficient to accomplish the latter. 
 
Elizabeth Anderson argues that a layperson’s second-order assessment of the 
trustworthiness of those making scientific claims consists in assessments of expertise, 
honesty, and epistemic responsibility (2011, 145-146). Regarding assessments of epistemic 
responsibility, Anderson says that: 
 
one must be able to judge whether testifiers are responsive to evidence, 
reasoning, and arguments others raise against their beliefs. This third 
criterion is needed to ensure that testifiers are basing their beliefs on a 
responsible exercise of their skills… The mark of epistemic 
responsibility is responsive accountability to the community of 
inquirers. One’s claims are suspect if one fails to hold oneself 
accountable to the demands for justification made by the community 
of inquirers (146). 
 
Some worries surely arise. It is frustrating to witness scientists carefully explain the process 
by which they arrived at a claim, answer questions, and respond patiently to objections, only 
to have a portion of the general public refuse to accept the claim on the basis of their own 
cognitive biases and other errors in reasoning. Public reason liberals might attempt to deal 
with this reality through idealization. If epistemic shortcomings prevent citizen C from 
recognizing that his or her objections are ill-formed and that scientists have adequately 
defended the claim, then public reason liberals may be warranted in claiming that C’s 
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idealized counterpart would recognize this and, and such, C has good reason to accept the 
claim.  
 
As is often the case though, things are not so simple. The problem of certification is 
especially pronounced for public reason liberals when it is the case that the relevant scientific 
community has discharged its responsibility to the general public and, yet, there remains a 
discrepancy between what the scientific consensus is and what the idealized counterparts of 
citizens could be said to have reason to believe. In an effort to achieve resolution, one may 
be tempted to apply progressively greater degrees of idealization to the citizenry. But public 
reason liberals should resist engaging in too much idealization for, if one over-idealizes, then 
the idealized counterparts of citizens will be so far removed from actual citizens that the 
idealized counterparts will affirm a set of reasons that we cannot reasonably expect actual 
citizens to arrive at (Gaus 2011).  
 
Over-idealization runs the risk of violating a key tenet of public reason liberalism insofar as 
we cannot be said to justify an action to a citizen if we are attributing non-reasonably-
accessible reasons to them. This amounts to abusing another device in the public reason 
liberal’s toolkit (device #1). Still, some idealization is needed to prevent superficial epistemic 
shortcomings from disrupting the process of public justification. A citizen should not be 
able to obstruct public justification when his or her objection constitutes, for example, an 
obvious straw man fallacy or is based on beliefs that are clearly false (such as the belief that 
the world is flat). To put this in the language of Reid’s article, too much idealization would 
deprive citizens of epistemic autonomy, but too little idealization would allow citizens to fail 
to defer when deference is warranted. 
 
Beyond Rawls 
 
While Reid’s focus is on Rawls, it is perhaps the case that Rawls is less exposed to the 
problem of certification than many other public reason liberals. This is because Rawls holds 
a narrow view regarding the scope of public reason (device #3). For Rawls, the scope of public 
reason is restricted to “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice” (Rawls 1996, 
214; 1999, 133; 2001, 91 fn. 13). The principle of public justification does not apply to 
matters that are neither constitutional essentials nor questions of basic justice. The 
prominence of the problem of certification within the Rawlsian framework is contingent on 
the extent to which scientific claims figure into the highly-abstract level at which Rawls 
operates. Whatever the result for Rawls, it is plausibly the case that the problem becomes 
more pronounced as we consider other less-abstract legislative matters in addition to 
constitutional matters. This is not to argue that Rawls is immune to considerations for the 
problem of certification, but rather to emphasize that if such considerations are relevant to 
the Rawlsian account, they are arguably more pressing for those public reason liberals who 
expand the scope of the public justification requirement. 
 
In speaking on non-Rawlsian public reason liberals, Reid remarks that “convergence 
theorists, I think, object to the idea of fixed facts, or at least not see them as important for 
their theory” (2019, p. 499). It is important to recognize, however, that what fundamentally 
distinguishes convergence models of public reason from consensus models is that 
convergence approaches reject the public-reasons-only restriction (device #2). Because of 
this, convergence theorists permit non-public reasons (i.e., those based in one’s personal 
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comprehensive doctrines) to enter into the justificatory domain and ground the acceptance 
of proposed laws. Another common, but non-fundamental, difference between consensus 
theorists and convergence theorists is that consensus theorists have tended to adopt an 
accessibility requirement which places some shared evaluative standards (i.e., agent-neutral 
rules of inference and evidence) on which reasons can enter into the justificatory domain. 
Rawls referred to such standards as “guidelines of inquiry” – the “principles of reasoning 
and rules of evidence …” (Rawls 1996, 223-224). While the earliest convergence theorists 
have rejected the accessibility requirement in favor of other alternatives (such as the less-
restrictive intelligibility requirement), there is nothing about the convergence approach that 
necessitates such a rejection (Tyndal 2019). The issue is further complicated by the 
possibility that the conditions that must be met in order to defeat a proposal may diverge 
from the conditions that must be met to merely accept a proposal. Nevertheless, whether 
one adopts the consensus or convergence approach, it is true that as soon as one leans on 
the notion of shared evaluative standards, Reid’s notion of fixed facts becomes salient and 
the problem of certification surfaces.  
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